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National legal systems often reflect interest group politics;
lawmakers commit their countries to a variety of different and some-
times conflicting goals, objectives and programs that jostle for power,
ascendancy, and resources.1 In turn, international laws frequently
mirror those aspects of national legal systems. As a result, modern
international law has institutionalized an array of goals. Some of
those goals are in the areas of health, communications, welfare, trans-
port, human rights, trade, and environmental protection. These va-
ried goals are potential sources of conflict. For example, the goals of
free trade and environmental protection have led to well established,
yet largely independent international legal regimes.
As in many national legal systems, interest group politics have led
to separate and conflicting regimes for free trade and environmental
protection within the international community. For example, begin-
ning in 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
2
[GATT1947] institutionalized global free trade. In 1994, the Uruguay
Round established an international implementation organization-the
1. See e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539,
1542 (1988). The theoretical underpinnings of interest group politics are traversed by: ROB-
ERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO
GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961); DAVID TRUMAN,
THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (1951); AR-
THUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 260-61 (Peter H. Odeyard ed., 1967);
THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED
STATES 51 (2d ed. 1979); E. E. SCHATISCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REAL-
IST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1960); LESTER W. MILBRATH, THE WASHING-
TON LOBBYISTS (1963); RAYMOND A. BAUER ET AL., AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC
POLICY: THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN TRADE (4th ed. 1972); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN &
JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986). "Public
Choice" theorists attempt to take this analysis further by applying economic theory to
political decisionmaking and treating the legislative process as a microeconomic system in
which actual political choices are determined by the efforts of individuals and groups to
further their own interest. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979); JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); ANTHONY
DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM
AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The
Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975); Frank
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983). For a full review of public
choice literature, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987).
2. See generally the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [annexed to the Final Act Adopted at the Conclusion of the Second
Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment, as subsequently rectified, amended or modified] [hereinafter GATr 1947].
GATT 1947 was further modified and supplemented and was adopted as Annex 1A of the
WTO Charter. See 33 I.L.M. 1124, 1127 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
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World Trade Organization (WTO). 3 Free trade, according to its advo-
cates, is the principal reason for nearly half a century of unrivaled
economic growth, prosperity, and comity following World War II.
Free trade proponents perceive the WTO Charter (with its an-
nexes and other covered agreements) and the GATT (WTO/GATT)
as semi-constitutional treaties that advance global prosperity through
the elimination of barriers to international free trade. Some argue
that state practices generated by GATT demonstrate a global commit-
ment to non-discrimination in trade, creating a peremptory norm of
international law, accepted and recognized by the international com-
munity of states. To the extent that derogation from this peremptory
norm, or jus cogens, is not possible, proponents argue that GATT has
been transformed from a legislative treaty into a semi-constitutional
regime.
International environmentalism and environmental protection-
ism, though boasting a much shorter genealogy than trade liberaliza-
tion, have displayed extraordinary force and dynamism. Two notable
international conferences, the Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment in 1972 (Stockholm) and the United Nations Confer-
ence on the Environment and Development in 1992 (UNCED or
Earth Summit), have attracted far more popular support than free
trade discussions. Peoples, governments, and non-governmental orga-
nizations have provided a surge of populism that has driven the explo-
sive growth in International Environmental Law (IEL) since the
1970s.
IEL institutions, however, are fragmented and lack the WTO's
global authority, organizational structure, financial backing, and legal
status. With the exception of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 4 many IEL legal forums lack the interna-
tional jurisdiction, authority and implementing powers of the WTO.
5
3. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. I, reprinted in Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embody-
ing the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1125, at 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Charter]. See also, WTO Charter, Annex 2 (Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes), reprinted at 33
I.L.M. 1125, at 1226-47 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
4. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/
122 (1982), S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-39 (1994), reprinted in Official Records volume XVII
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
5. Organizations with environmental functions include the Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Or-
ganization (UNESCO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Na-
tions Environmental Programme (UNEP), and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). This partial list exemplifies the fractured nature
of international oversight of IEL.
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GATT panels, and the new, stronger Dispute Settlement Body (DSB),
which was formed under the WTO, have unusually high institutional
and legal prominence. As a result, the GATT panels and the DSB
have emerged as the sole legal fora for resolving many disputes be-
tween advocates of environmental protection and advocates of free
trade. The GATT panels' and the DSB's assertion of jurisdiction have
become all the more portentous because they apply substantive law
that pays very little attention to the mission of IEL and that treats the
IEL Mission as irrelevant unless embodied in "Covered Agree-
ments."' 6 These panels view IEL trade restrictions as obstructions to
the painfully engineered legal regime that was created by GATT/
WTO to liberalize trade by eliminating controls and restrictions. Fur-
thermore, the judges 7 who interpret the substantive law8 are unfamil-
iar with, if not unfriendly toward, international environmental
protection.9
At least four recent international treaties have offended the free
trade rules of GATT/WTO by employing trade sanctions to achieve
better environmental protection. For instance, the Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol) 10
seeks to protect the global commons from ozone depleting chemicals
by regulating trade. The Convention on International Trade in En-
6. See DSU, supra note 3, art. 3, paras. 1, 2.
7. Article 8 of the DSU states that judges should be:
"persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a represen-
tative of a Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a representative
to the Council or Committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor agree-
ment, or in the Secretariate, taught or published on international trade law or
policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member."
See DSU, supra note 3, art. 8, para. 1. It is striking that this list does not include anyone
with qualifications outside the field of trade law. This omission suggests a disregard for
expertise in other fields, such as international environmental law, unless such prospective
panelists have credentials also listed in article 8.
8. GATT does recognize the need for trade restrictions in some circumstances. See
Article XX of GAT 1947. However, GATT considers those circumstances to be a nar-
rowly construed exception to the GATT rules. See infra, notes 26-54 and accompanying
text.
9. See, e.g., WTO Report of the Panel, in United States - Standards for Reformu-
lated and Conventional Gasoline, (W.T.O. Jan. 29, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 274, available at 1996
WL 738802 (W.T.O.) ([hereinafter Venezuela Gasoline Decision]. This report noted that
the Panel's task was to ensure that the provisions and objectives of the General Agreement
were maintained notwithstanding the desirability or necessity of the environmental objec-
tives of the proposed legislation in dispute. Id. para. 7.1. In this case Venezuela protested
the United States' restrictions on the importation of reformulated gasoline. Venezuela suc-
cessfully claimed that the Clean Air Act (CAA) was discriminatory because foreign produ-
cers were generally treated less favorably than domestic refineries. Id. para. 6.15. See
infra note 36 for the ultimate disposition of this case.
10. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) (as amended 32 I.L.M. 874 (1992)) [hereinaf-
ter Montreal Protocol].
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dangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)11 regulates trade
that threatens international biodiversity by export and import restric-
tions and prohibitions on trading with non-parties. The Basel Con-
vention on the Control of Trans-boundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention)' 2 bans imports that
damage domestic environments. The Convention for the Prohibition
of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific (South Pacific Con-
vention) 13 prohibits its signatory states' nationals, and vessels docu-
mented under the signatory states' laws, from engaging in driftnet
fishing within the South Pacific. A fair minded forum might see these
conventions as international laws that create reasonable tools for us-
ing trade sanctions to bring pressure to bear on recalcitrant nation
states that fail to abide by environmental rules. On the other hand,
WTO panels are required to ignore environmental treaties to which
all GATT parties have not agreed. In fact, the WTO panels may in-
validate those environmental treaties as barriers to free trade.
This Article argues that it is not necessary for IEL to be forced
into the procrustean bed of trade law. GATT/WTO tribunals now ad-
judicate a significant number of issues that could be heard in more
impartial fora that could recognize and uphold, rather than diminish
or marginalize IEL. This Article points out that, within key areas of
potential conflict, the substantive international environmental obliga-
tions and the dispute settlement procedures of the UNCLOS over-
come GATI'/WTO concerns over free trade. UNCLOS incorporates
substantive principles of IEL and creates a binding system of adjudi-
cation and dispute resolution that confers upon its legal forums the
jurisdiction and adjudicatory authority to hear trade and environment
disputes. Even where states are not parties to UNCLOS, but never-
theless accept its provisions as codifications of customary IEL, the In-
ternational Court of Justice (ICJ) can adjudicate trade and
environment disputes in limited circumstances.
11. Convention of International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, art. II, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, 12 I.L.M. 1085, 1088 (entered
into force July 1, 1975) [hereinafter CITES]. Appendix I includes species that currently are
threatened with extinction. Id. at art. II, para. 1. Appendix II lists species that are not
currently threatened with extinction but may become threatened unless trade in the species
is strictly regulated. Id. at art. II, para. 2(a). Appendix III consists of those species that
any party has identified as requiring protection to prevent the species' demise from trade
driven exploitation. Id. at art. II, para. 3.
12. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal, March 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657, art. 4 [hereinafter Basel
Convention].
13. Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pa-




Part I of this Article demonstrates the environmental lacunas in
GATT/WTO. Part II contrasts GATT/WTO with the potential impact
of UNCLOS's substantive environmental obligations. Part III exam-
ines the multilateral environmental treaties that empower, and some-
times require, parties to restrict or prohibit trade with non-parties and
also examines the extent to which UNCLOS mandates environmen-
tally motivated actions despite the fact that they might run afoul of
GATT. Finally, Part IV emphasizes the importance of compulsory ad-
judication as a tool for enforcing international environmental norms
and suggests how UNCLOS tribunals could assume this role for the
parties to UNCLOS. However, the United States has not ratified UN-
CLOS. This Article suggests that the ICJ could become a judicial fo-
rum that applies the substantive law of UNCLOS.
This Article concludes that the international organizations under
the UNCLOS umbrella do not enjoy institutional parity of status or
strength with GATT/WTO. Despite this imbalance, the substantive
environmental provisions of UNCLOS do in fact offset the effects of
GATT/WTO. Moreover, in conjunction with UNCLOS's dispute set-
tlement procedures, the environmental provisions have created com-
peting legal fora for furthering international environmental
protection.
This Article has the limited objective of pointing to the availabil-
ity of alternative legal forums untainted by the bias of GATT/WTO
panels. It does not purport to predict how UNCLOS tribunals or the
ICJ will decide cases brought before them. These fora will address
difficult questions of substantive and procedural law, such as choice of
forum, the legality of treaty authorized actions, and the more contro-
versial unilateral measures taken by the United States to protect the
international environment. A subsequent Article will discuss the sub-
stantive and procedural issues raised by such cases.
I
THE ENVIRONMENTAL LACUNAS IN GATI/WTO
The environmental lacunas in GATF/WTO are evident in its the-
oretical and conceptual underpinnings, substantive law, and in the re-
cent calls for reform of GAT/WTO. Space does not permit a
comprehensive discussion of the defects of GATT/WTO. However, a
brief outline of the shortcomings provides a foundation for the thesis
of this Article.
A. Conceptual Underpinnings
GATT/WTO seeks to create a global market for goods and serv-
ices and a foundation of mutual economic benefit by establishing a
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predictable trading environment. Comparative advantage theory
posits that different nations will be relatively better off at producing
different goods and services according to their own advantageous po-
sitions arising from a variety of physical, natural or social factors.
14
Cyprus can make use of its sunny and warm climate to produce or-
anges, while Scotland is better able to produce Scotch whisky because
of the country's peat and fast flowing clean rivers. By trading such
products, consumers benefit by having access to a wider range of
goods at lower prices and the market, or economy, expands to the
benefit of all. Trade liberalization facilitates this process by creating
opportunities through free access to markets and thereby increases
economic activity.
The philosophy underlying WTO and GATT is largely premised
on the belief that developing the use of world resources and ex-
panding productivity will lead to higher standards of living and will
maximize the welfare of all.' 5 It is essential to this outcome that the
market remain open and that nations be prevented from setting up
barriers to free trade. GATT seeks to achieve this objective, inter alia,
by demanding nondiscrimination among products on the basis of their
national origin.
16
However, the market system is unable to provide adequate incen-
tives for nations to undertake socially desirable activities that generate
positive environmental externalities. Clean air, water, and oceans are
collective goods or global commons. They remain outside the market
because no one possesses property rights that enable exchange or
14. Specifically, these factors include such matters as: access to raw materials, cheap
labor, appropriate climate and an educated workforce. For a summary of the extensive
economics literature on the theory of comparative advantage, see JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 10-15 (1989); see also, JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCrURING THE
GATT SYSTEM, 8-14 (1990).
15. WTO Member States proclaim that they:
[r]ecogniz[e] that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full em-
ployment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective
demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while
allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the ob-
jective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the envi-
ronment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their
respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development,
See WTO Charter supra note 3, preamble; reprinted at 33 I.L.M. 1144. Further, Member
States proclaim themselves "desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction
of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international trade relations." Id.
16. This is translated into two commitments of WTO Member States- 1) to extend
tariff reductions that are granted to a Member Nation to all Member Nations (Most Fa-
vored Nation Treatment) and 2) to treat imported products no less favorably than domestic
products (National Treatment). See GAIT 1947 supra note 2, arts. I (Most Favored Na-
tion) & III (National Treatment).
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trade. Consequently, nations often pollute public goods with impunity
causing the well known "tragedy of the commons."'1 7 In such circum-
stances, regulation or litigation is necessary to correct these market
failures and to restore the conditions that enable markets to function
efficiently. 18
In addition, free trade may lead to inefficient patterns of interna-
tional trade in which less developed countries (LDCs) exploit natural
resources to be sold to rich developed countries who are hungry for
those resources. These patterns lead to the unsustainable exploitation
of natural resources such as oil, minerals, fauna, and flora by poorer
countries and results in comparative disadvantages and environmental
destruction. 19
Finally, not accounting for the true costs, as distinguished from
depreciated costs, of pollution and resource exhaustion can lead to
damaging environmental consequences. Natural resource accounts
are used by countries to calculate their gross and net national product
(GNP). These national income accounts value people-made assets as
productive capital, but do not treat the natural resource base in the
same way. Consequently, the depreciation of plant and capital is
charged against the value of the national product as depreciated costs.
By contrast, "a country can exhaust its mineral resources, cut down its
forests, erode its soils, pollute its aquifers, and hunt its wildlife and
fisheries to extinction"20 without any loss to national product. The
true costs are thereby ignored. Free trade assumes perpetual growth
is possible and seems oblivious to the accelerated exhaustion of natu-
ral resources. It is clear, however, that unbridled economic growth
cannot be sustained in an over-populated world that is moving toward
a bankruptcy of critical natural resources and a breakdown of re-gen-
erative and bio-physical capacity.
21
Despite a rhetorical reference to environmental protection in the
preamble of the WTO,2 2 GATT/WTO calls for the advance of free
17. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45
(1968) (introducing the term and concept).
18. Of course, there is no international government with the authority to force nation
states to comply with pollution regulations. Any international action must be consensual
through negotiation, not command and control. Moreover, regulations may be exceedingly
difficult to draft.
19. See Graciela Chichilinsky, Biodiversity and Economic Values, in PROTECTION OF
GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY: CONVERGING INTERDISCIPLINARY STRATEGIES 125 (Lakshman D.
Guruswamy & Jeffrey A. McNeely eds., forthcoming 1997).
20. ROBERT REPETrO ET AL, WASTING ASSETS: NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE NA-
TIONAL INCOME ACCOUNT, 2 (World Resources Institute, 1989).
21. See Herman E. Daly, Problems with Free Trade: Neoclassical and Steady-State Per-
spectives, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY, 147-57
(Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1993).
22. See WTO Charter, supra note 3 at 33 I.L.M. 1144.
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trade effectively unrestrained by environmental concerns. Such an en-
vironmentally disadvantageous advancement of free trade has been
justified by the WTO Ministerial Conference on the grounds that
WTO trade requirements are pre-conditions to environmental re-
straints.23 The underlying premise of this assertion is that any envi-
ronmental damage caused along the way can be remedied once
economic prosperity is achieved. Such a thesis stands unproven. In
fact, one prominent example, the United States' experience cleaning
up toxic and hazardous waste sites, demonstrates the contrary. The
United States is the most prosperous nation in the world and has
spent many more billions of dollars cleaning up hazardous waste sites
that result from the lack of environmental regulation than it would
have done if the creation, and disposal, of hazardous wastes had been
controlled by environmental regulations.
24
In an apparently candid admission, the GATT secretariat con-
ceded that it is reasonable for concerned countries to seek to change
the actions and policies of others that damage the global environ-
ment.25 Unfortunately, these countries are not permitted by GAT to
bring about change by disallowing products of offending countries
from entering their markets.
B. Substantive Law
In order to overcome GATT prohibitions against trade restric-
tions,26 it is necessary to find justification under GATT 1947 Article
XX [hereinafter Article XX], which provides:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which could constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
23. See Report (1996) of the Committee on Trade and Environment, at paras. 169-74
(visited Mar. 16, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/environ/bulletin.htm>.
24. The estimated cost of cleaning up a hazardous waste site in the United States runs
between $21 million and $30 million. See Superfund, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENVIRON-
MENT, 678-79 (Ruth A. Eban & William R. Eban eds., 1994). The EPA has identified
nearly 41,000 potentially hazardous waste sites across the country. See COUNCIL ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY
REPORT 365 (1996). Preventative environmental measures adopted over the past 25 years
have reduced wastes at their sources while encouraging recycling and safe disposal of haz-
ardous materials. See id. Moreover, the costs of building a modem, fully lined landfill,
designed to prevent leaching into groundwater and to withstand severe weather, and
equipped with modern monitoring equipment is far less than the cleanup costs thus
avoided. See JOSEPH L. BAST ET AL., ECO-SANITY 24-28 (1994).
25. See GATT Secretariat Report: Trade and the Environment (1992), reprinted in
John H. Jackson et. at., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations 562 (3d ed.
1995) [FORMAT].
26. Such prohibitions are usually based on GATT 1947, Article XI (restricting Mem-
ber States' available trade barriers to tariffs and like duties) and Article III (requiring
National Treatment of imported products)-
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or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agree-
ment shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by
any contracting party of measures ... (b) necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health [or that are] ... (g) relating to the con-
servation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption.
2 7
The extensive jurisprudence dealing with the nature and ambit of
these exceptions 28 will not be explored in this discussion. Instead, this
Article takes a functional look at the application of these exceptions
in three recent cases that offer a baseline for interpreting Article XX
exceptions. 29 According to these decisions, the very narrow basis on
27. See GATT 1947 supra note 2, art. XX(b) & (g).
28. See generally 2 (Legal Analysis) FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUI-
SITES FOR FREE TRADE?, at 57-174 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996);
Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Re-
gional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 236-44 (1997); Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment The Continuing
Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 269, 273-80 & passim (1997); John H.
Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1227, 1239-42 (1992); Cynthia M. Maas, Note, Should the WTO Expand
GATT Article XX: An Analysis of United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conven-
tional Gasoline, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 415, 426-27 (1996); Chris Wold, Multilateral
Environmental Agreements and the GATT: Conflict and Resolution?, 26 ENVTL. L. 841,
854-61 (1996); Charles R. Fletcher, Greening World Trade: Reconciling GATT and Multilat-
eral Environmental Agreements Within the Existing World Trade Regime, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L
L. & POL'Y 341, 352-57 (1996); Kazumochi Kometani, Trade and Environment: How
Should WTO Panels Review Environmental Regulations Under GATT Articles III and
XX?, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 441, 466-76 (1996); Paul J. Yechout, Note, In the Wake of
Tuna 11: New Possibilities for GATT - Compliant Environmental Standards, 5 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 247, 255-57, 264-68 (1996); Shannon Hudnall, Towards a Greener Interna-
tional Trade System: Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the World Trade Organi-
zation, 29 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 175, 186-91 (1996); Diana Hurwitz, Fishing for
Compromises Through NAFTA and Environmental Dispute Settlement: The Tuna-Dolphin
Controversy, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 501, 508 (1995); Winfried Lang, Comment, Is the Pro-
tection of the Environment a Challenge to the International Trading System?, 7 GFo. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 463, 472 (1995); Ilona Cheyne, Environmental Unilateralism and the WTO/
GATT System, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 433, 451-63 (1995); Douglas J. Caldwell, Note
and Comment, International Environmental Agreements and the GATT: An Analysis of the
Potential Conflict and the Role of a GATT "Waiver" Resolution, 18 MD. J. INT'L L. &
TRADE 173, 185-87 (1994); Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions and the
GATT. An Analysis of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices, 9 AM. U.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 751, 791-96 (1994); Mathew Hunter Hurlock, Note, The GATT, U.S.
Law and the Environment: A Proposal to Amend the GATT in Light of the Tuna/Dolphin
Decision, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2106-10 (1992); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free Interna-
tional Trade and Protection of the Environment; Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
700, 710-17 (1992); Christopher D. Stone, Too Many Fishing Boats, Too Few Fish: Can
Trade Laws Trim Subsidies and Restore the Balance in Global Fisheries?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q.
505 (1997).
29. See GATI Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna I]; United States -
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, June 16, 1994, available in 1994 WL 907620 [hereinafter
Tuna II]; Venezuela Gasoline Decision, supra note 9.
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which environmental action can be justified does not provide a satis-
factory basis for justifying, much less vindicating, environmental
protection.
GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Re-
strictions on Imports of Tuna,30 [hereinafter Tuna I] was a case in
which the United States Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA)
31
required the relevant authorities to ban the importation of yellow
tuna that had been caught with dolphin-killing nets. After years of
fruitless negotiation between the U.S. and Mexico to establish rules
for dolphin mortality, the U.S. prohibited the importation of yellow
tuna caught with dolphin-killing rather than dolphin-friendly nets.
32
The GATT Panel held that the U.S. ban violated GATT and did not
fall within the exceptions in Article XX (b), (d) or (g).33
Three years after Tuna I, in United States-Restrictions on Im-
ports of Tuna (Tuna II),34 the European Economic Community chal-
lenged the secondary embargo provisions of the MMPA that required
any intermediary nation exporting yellowfin tuna to the United States
to provide the relevant authorities with proof that such yellowfin tuna
had not been caught with dolphin-killing nets.35 Once again the
GATT panel held against the United States. According to the Panel
such action was not "necessary" under Article XX(b), and was not
"primarily aimed at" the conservation of natural resources under Arti-
cle XX(g).
The Report of the Appellate Body in United States-Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Venezuela Gasoline Ap-
peal) 36 was an appeal by the U.S. from a WTO Dispute Settlement
Panel requested by Venezuela and Brazil to review pollution stan-
dards imposed on gasoline imports by the United States Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act (CAA). The
EPA calculated these standards from 1990 baselines, and the dispute
essentially revolved around whether domestic refiners were given an
unfair and preferential advantage over foreign refiners in the formula-
tion and setting of such standards. The Appellate Body ruled that the
manner in which the United States determined the 1990 baselines, and
30. See Tuna I, supra note 29.
31. See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1361-1421 (West Supp. 1997).
32. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling International Trade with Preservation of the
Global Commons: Can We Prosper and Protect, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407, 1411, 1415-
33 (1992).
33. See id.
34. See Tuna II, supra note 29.
35. See Tuna II, supra note 29, para. 2.12.
36. May 20, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 603 [hereinafter Venezuela Gasoline Appeal].
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the consequent pollution standards for gasoline under the CAA, could
not be justified under Article XX(b), (d) or (g).37
In these three cases, the United States took action to protect the
environment but did not specifically argue that it was obliged to do so
by treaty. In light of the apparently "unilateral" nature of the U.S.
action, a preliminary question is whether GATT/WTO permits envi-
ronmental action that has been authorized and mandated, but is not
obligatory, by a multilateral treaty that did not include all GATT con-
tractual parties.
38
In fact, Tuna II addressed that question. 39 While not claiming
that its actions were obligated by CITES, the U.S. did offer treaty
justification for its actions by arguing generally that they "were consis-
tent with and directly furthered the objectives" 40 of CITES and other
environmental treaties. More specifically, the U.S. argued that the ac-
tions were authorized and empowered by CITES. According to the
U.S.:
All species of dolphins involved in the fishery of the eastern tropical
Pacific were listed in CITES Appendix II. Moreover, while the
United States was not obliged under CITES to adopt the measures at
issue, CITES specifically provided for these measures in providing for
"stricter domestic measures" in order to further the objectives of that
agreement. The Unites States' measures were stricter domestic meas-
ures, as explicitly contemplated under CITES, taken to protect species
of dolphins that CITES protects. These measures were in addition to
the restrictions on trade in specimens of the dolphins themselves that
are required under CITES . . .41
The U.S. relied upon CITES and other international environmen-
tal treaties to contend that these treaties should, according to interna-
tional law, be taken into account as general or special rules for
interpreting Article XX of GATT.42 The U.S. also argued that the
37. See Venezuela Gasoline Appeal, supra note 36, para. 8.1.
38. There would, of course, be no problem if the multilateral treaties included all
GATI parties and were (a) entered into subsequent to GAT, or (b) seen as a "lex
specialis"-a specialist treaty. In both cases such multilateral treaties would trump GATIT.
See Tuna II, supra note 29, para. 3.41.
39. In that case the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Netherlands suc-
cessfully initiated GAT proceedings against the United States similar to Mexico's suit
against the United States in Tuna I. The EEC claimed that the United States' intermediary
ban on indirect imports of tuna was hurting European fishing industries. The WTO panel
concluded that "measures taken so as to force other countries to change their policies, and
that were effective only if such changes occurred, could not be primarily aimed either
at ... rendering effective restrictions on domestic production or consumption." See Tuna
II, supra note 29, para. 5.27.
40. See Tuna 11, supra note 29, para. 3.4
41. Id.
42. The U.S. relied on Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties Between States and International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543,
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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actions taken by the parties to these multilateral environmental trea-
ties constituted "subsequent practice" under general international law
and under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Treaties.
The Panel made short shrift of these arguments. It asserted that the
CITES and the other environmental treaties were not subsequent
agreements, regarding the interpretation or application of Article
XX,43 which had been signed by all the parties to the GATT. The
Panel bluntly declared that CITES and the other treaties "did not ap-
ply to the interpretation of the General Agreement or the application
of its provisions.
'44
As this Article will demonstrate, by so holding the Panel was act-
ing in conformity with GATT law and jurisprudence. The recognition
that environmental treaties affect the interpretation or application of
GATT in any way would require judicial lawmaking that the GATT/
WTO panels are forbidden from undertaking.45 This particular aspect
of the decision in Tuna II was just one of the ways in which GAT',
and the decisions of GATT/WTO tribunals, have obstructed the im-
plementation of environmental treaties. Five of them merit mention.
First, the word "necessary" (to protect human, animal or plant
life and health) in Article XX(b) has been restrictively interpreted 46
to mean that a government may not employ a necessary measure if it
could use an alternative and less trade-offensive measure. Even
where a measure is required to protect human, animal or plant life or
health, it may well be held to be unnecessary in the view of the
GATTI/WTO tribunal. Import and export restrictions under CITES
could well be struck down on the basis that they are not the least
trade-restrictive measures available to the country concerned.
Second, Tuna II interpreted "relating to" (the conservation of ex-
haustible natural resources) in Article XX(g) to allow extra-territorial
43. See Tuna II, supra note 29, para. 3.20.
44. Id. para. 5.19 (emphasis added).
45. See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
46. This happened in Tuna II, supra note 29, where the panel stated that the United
States' measures to protect dolphin life or health were not necessary because such meas-
ures failed a proportionality test that required the use of reasonable alternative measures
not inconsistent with GAT. See id. para. 5.26-5.27. In Venezuela Gasoline Decision,
supra note 9, the United States argued that the non-degradation requirements of the
United States Clean Air Act were "necessary to protect human, animal, and plant life or
health." See Venezuela Gasoline Decision, supra note 9, § 3.40. However, the WTO
Panel, while noting that gasoline emissions are tied to human health, was more impressed
by the fact that imported gasoline was accorded different treatment than United States
gasoline, and held that the measures taken were not "necessary" to protect human, animal,
or plant life or health. See id, para. 6.29. The Appellate Body "left intact" the conclusions
of the Panel and ruled that the United States had violated the "chapeau" or introductory
clauses of Article XX by taking actions that constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" and
a "disguised restriction" on international trade. See Venezuela Gasoline Appeal, supra
note 36, 35 I.L.M. at 633.
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conservation efforts which had been prohibited by Tuna 1. 47 However,
the Appellate Body in Venezuela Gasoline Appeal reconfirmed that
the extraterritorial rule asserted in Tuna II should be "primarily
aimed" at the conservation of exhaustible natural resources,48 as de-
termined by GATJ/WTO. This means that a GATT/WTO tribunal
can impune any action taken under the Basel Convention or Montreal
Protocol on the basis that the action is, in the tribunal's view, not pri-
marily aimed at conservation even if the concerned states assert a con-
trary view.
Third, GATT/WTO tribunals have assumed a disturbing in-
terventionist character. Oblivious of their appellate status, they seem
eager to override the judgment of nation states with which they disa-
gree and make their own decisions on the facts. They seem unaware
of judicial restraint, of the need for deference to the decisions of na-
tional fact finding bodies, or of the standards of review that restrain an
appellate body from interfering in an executive action unless it is arbi-
trary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.
49
Fourth, Tuna I reiterated the rule that Article XX could only be
directed at products and not at process or production methods.
50 It
concluded that measures aimed at reducing dolphin mortality were a
production method and were not covered by Article XX(g). Accord-
ing to this interpretation, the Montreal Protocol would clearly be con-
trary to GATIT.
Finally, the Appellate Body in the Venezuela Gasoline Appeal
created another formidable hurdle against states seeking to claim the
environmental exemptions under Article XX. In summary, the Ap-
pellate Body found that the burden placed on states that sought to
47. See Tuna I, supra note 29, para. 5.26.
49. See Venezuela Gasoline Appeal, supra note 36, 35 LL.M. at 622-23; see, also, Thna
II, supra note 29, para. 3.52-3.53.
49. The Appellate Body in the Venezuela Gasoline Appeal freely dismissed the diffi-
culties facing EPA in collecting evidence from foreign countries in order to give foreign
refineries individual baselines. See Venezuela Gasoline Appeal, supra note 36, at 629-31.
There is recognition within trade circles of this problem. See generally, Steven P. Croley &
John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National
Governments, 90 AM. J. INr'L L. 193 (1996). These distinguished authors raise serious
concerns regarding the comparability of WTO tribunals to national courts or other adjudi-
cative fora. See id. at 211-13. For purposes of reviewing administrative or executive ac-
tions in domestic law, the authors believe that these international bodies face inherent
limitations that are not necessarily identical to limitations in the domestic setting. See id.
Such a conclusion is at variance with the fundamental assumptions underlying any alloca-
tion of power in an undeveloped international legal order that lacks compulsory jurisdic-
tion. Where sovereign states allocate limited power to a functional international tribunal
under GATT/WTO, such tribunals ought to be very sensitive to the demarcation of powers
between sovereign states and international organization. This sensitivity should lead to
greater, not less, deference to national decisionmaking.
50. See Tuna I, supra note 29, para. 5.11.
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come within Article XX was not confined to satisfying the narrow
health, environment, and natural resource exemptions found within
paragraphs (a) to (j). States must also prove that the measures taken
do not violate the "chapeau" (introductory or preambular provisions)
of Article XX, which prohibit "arbitrary" or "unjustified" discrimina-
tion or a "disguised restriction" of free trade. In holding that the
United States had violated the chapeau, the Appellate Body demon-
strated no hesitation to overrule decisions and rules made by the
United States Environmental Protection Agency-the administrative
agency that makes decisions affecting national environmental policy.
In doing so, the Appellate Body showed scant regard for the ordinary
and well recognized principles of deference accorded primary
decisionmakers.51
The law applied by GATT/WTO is confined to that found in its
own treaties and does not recognize any broader corpus of general
international law, let alone IEL. Because there is no distinction made
in the language of Article XX between treaty and non-treaty justifica-
tion, it is a mistake to argue that unilateral decisions are more difficult
to justify than those based on multilateral treaties.5 2 Since environ-
mental protection has never been a GATT/WTO objective, covered
agreements do not deal with environmental protection apart from the
exceptions found in Article XX. A plethora of provisions make it
abundantly clear that the GATr/WTO Panels and Appellate Bodies
must restrict themselves to the Understanding and the Covered
51. See Venezuela Gasoline Appeal, supra note 36, 35 I.L.M. at 627-30.
52. Any attempt to draw support for such a proposition from the Tuna II decision
would be a misinterpretation. Despite Tuna II's holding that a country may not take uni-
lateral measures that force or cajole others into changing their domestic environmental
policies, it is still possible that such changes may be made by treaty. If that were the case,
action taken under treaty to implement agreed changes to domestic behavior may be justi-
fied under GATT/WTO. However, as we have seen, the Panel dismissed that conclusion




Agreements, 53 which should be strictly construed not to add to or di-
minish the rights and obligations provided by the treaties.
54
DSU Article 3(2) is an interesting provision that has all the
hallmarks of an unresolved disagreement. It reiterates that the dis-
pute settlement system should first, preserve the rights and obligations
of Members under the Covered Agreements, and, second, clarify the
existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary
rules of interpretation of public international law.55 Having stated
this, it proceeds immediately to attenuate future interpretation by
prohibiting any tribunal from adding to or diminishing rights and obli-
gations provided in the Covered Agreements.5 6 This flies in the face
of judicial lawmaking and assumes a set of precise, tailor made, pre-
determined and inflexible rights and duties that can be mechanically
dispensed without any judicial intervention.
5 7
Such an approach is untenable for a number of reasons. First, the
Understanding and the Covered Agreements were made by humans
not gods and could not anticipate every fact, contingency, and circum-
stance that could give rise to controversies about rights and duties.
Second, the Understanding and Covered Agreements cannot antici-
pate the law that should be applied in every situation. Each set of
rights and duties ought to be applied to the particular, variegated fact
53. See, e.g., DSU supra note 3, art. 3(4). "Recommendations or rulings made by the
DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter in accordance with
the rights and obligations under this Understanding and under the covered agreements." Id.
(emphasis added). See also, id., art. 3(5). "All solutions ... shall be consistent with those
agreements and shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any Member under those
agreements, nor impede the attainment of any objective of those agreements." Id. (emphasis
added). DSU Article 7 deals with the "terms of reference," which are limits on issues and
applicable law to be considered by the panels. See DSU arts. 7(1) & 7(2). It dictates "the
relevant provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the
dispute" as a term of reference of panels unless otherwise agreed by the disputing Member
States within 20 days of the establishment of the panel. See id. DSU Article 11 deals with
the functions of panels and requires them to assess the "[a]pplicability of and conformity
with the relevant covered agreements ..... It does not refer to any other laws or
principles.
54. DSU Article 3(2) states conclusively that "[r]ecommendations and rulings of the
DSB [referring to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body] cannot add to or diminish the rights
and obligations provided in the covered agreements" (emphasis added).
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. Apart from judicial interpretation, Article IX of the WTO Charter allows for
adoption of "interpretations" that do not "undermine the amendment provisions in Article
X." See WTO Charter supra note 3, art. IX(2). Such interpretations must be adopted by
the WTO Ministerial Conference or General Council, then must be approved by three
quarters of WTO Member States. See id. The super-majority requirement renders non-
judicially determined interpretations impracticable. At the same time, any such interpreta-
tion is open to legal challenge as amounting to an amendment. See Michael Lennard, The
World Trade Organization and Disputes Involving Multilateral Environmental Agreements,
5 EUR. ENvrL. L. REv. 306, 310 (1996).
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situation; the scope of each right and duty could not possibly be or-
dained in advance. The need for this flexibility is the reason why in-
ternational instruments are couched in various degrees of generality
and indeterminacy. 58 Third, while duties and rights are correlative
concepts, 59 they are "institutions" and tools of judicial reasoning for
deriving and assigning benefits and burdens. It has been persuasively
argued that institutional concepts consist of three sets of rules: 1) a set
of constitutive rules specifying situations to which they might be ap-
plied; 2) a set of rules specifying the legal consequences; and 3) termi-
native rules specifying outcomes. 60 Each step involves judicial
analysis, reasoning, discretion, and power within a continuing time
frame to ascertain the nature, scope, and applicability of indetermi-
nate rights and duties.
The Understanding attenuates judicial discretion to adapt the law
to new situations. It defies reality by assuming that an initial expres-
sion of law in a treaty freezes both time and content. In fact, any
expression of law is intended to be applied to future events over an
indefinite period of time during which its initial meaning is subject to
change.
The customary international rules of interpretation, as restated in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Conven-
tion),61 assume there can be no expression of rights and obligations
that can be applied automatically with dogmatic immutability. In-
stead, the Vienna Convention calls for any treaty to be interpreted
according to its ordinary meaning in "[c]ontext and in the light of its
object and purpose." The Vienna Convention also states that any ap-
plicable rules of international law should be taken into account.
62
The Understanding has apparently rejected the Vienna Conven-
tion criteria by asserting that the rights and obligations set out in the
covered agreements are sufficient for all purposes and earlier refer-
ences to rules of interpretation in the Understanding must be under-
stood as aspirational and decorative rather than obligatory. The
emerging proffle of an inward looking, even blinkered, judicial system
58. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-25 (1961).
59. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOMFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS AS APPLIED
IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 36, 67 & passim (Walter Wheeler
Cook ed., 1923).
60. See Neil MacCormick, Law as Institutional Fact, 90 L.Q. REV. 102 (1974).
61. See VIENNA CONVENTION, supra note 42, arts. 31 & 32.
62. See id. art. 31, para. 3(c). The Appellate Body in Venezuela Gasoline Appeal paid
pro forma respect to WTO Charter art. 3(2) and to the rules of interpretation in the Vienna
Convention, which the Appellate Body correctly identified as forming part of customary
law. Having suggested that GATT/WTO should not be read in "clinical isolation from
public international law," the Appellate Body could not, however, escape the predicament
that all its decisions should be subject to the GATT and the covered agreements. See
Venezuela Gasoline Appeal, supra note 36.
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that shuts out the broader corpus of international law becomes evi-
dent when compared to the jurisprudence of the ICJ. ICJ decisions
apply international conventions, international custom, the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations, judicial decisions,
and the teachings of "the most highly qualified publicists. ''63 The law
applied by GATT/WTO is confined to its own agreements.
C. Calls for Reform
The environmental lacunas in GATT have led to a variety of calls
for reform. Some pressed that GATT be "greened, '64 urging proce-
dural, interpretive, and substantive reforms.65 However, the reform
initiative did not get off to a promising start when the environment-
as a subject-was excluded from the GATT Uruguay Round (the ne-
gotiating round) that resulted in the creation of the WTO in 1994.
This was followed by a decision of the Group on Environmental
Measures and International Trade (GEMIT) declining to formulate
new rules for dealing with trade sanctions mandated by agreements
such as the Montreal Protocol, the Basel Convention, and CITES. It
opted instead for a case-by-case determination after the event.
66
A different initiative has fared no better. Pursuant to a decision
made at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the Committee on
Trade and Environment (CTE) came into existence in 1995. CTE's
mandate was to examine trade and environmental issues within the
letter and spirit of the new trade regime and submit its initial report to
the WTO Ministerial Conference to be held in Singapore in Decem-
ber, 1996.67 Given that strict WTO trade law constrained CTE's envi-
ronmental deliberations,68 it is not in the least surprising that the
63. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, art.
38.
64. A succinct and perceptive summary of these views is found in DANIEL C. EsTY,
GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE 205-24 (1994).
65. These reforms included developing procedures for environmental assessments of
trade agreements, building greater transparency into GATT negotiations to assure requi-
site environmental input, restructuring GAT[ dispute settlement procedures, sanctioning
trade measures to enforce international environmental agreements, broadening the scope
of GATT's environmental provisions, (particularly the exceptions provided for in Article
XX of GAT[ 1947), defining the scope of allowable unilateral trade action to vindicate
global environmental protection goals, and developing guidelines for regulation of eco-
labeling and packaging. See id. at 223-24.
66. See Bernard O'Connor & Anthony Van de Ven, Trade and Environment: An Up-
date on the GATT Agenda, 4 EUR. ENvTL. L. REV. 20, 21 (1996).
67. See Sabrina Shaw, Trade and Environment: The Post-Singapore WTO Agenda, 6
REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENvTL. L. 105 (1997).
68. See id. at 105-06.
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CTE69 failed to concede to multilateral trade agreements (MTAs)
containing trade sanctions. While it does profess a post Singapore
agenda, the mandate of the CTE precludes it from being an engine of
reform.
Others, more aware of the difficulties of such an endeavor and
the need for an institution rivaling WTO, have called for creation of a
World Environment Organization (WEO) that can match the WTO70
or for even a more modest organization such as the International La-
bor Organization. 71 Advocates acknowledge that the prospects for
their proposals are not promising,72 and their lack of optimism is well
founded.
The last quarter of the twentieth century saw a withdrawal from
institution building. For instance, the formation of UNCED dealt
with similarly high-minded proposals for an autonomous, powerful,
environmental organization. 73 Despite the fact that the two major
conventions and the other instruments emerging from the Rio Earth
Summit could have benefitted enormously from a strong global envi-
ronmental body, a relatively weak Commission on Sustainable Devel-
opment (CSD) emerged.
74
Others have taken a more jurisprudential look at trade law and
the GATT/WTO's dispute resolution system, and have delineated a
different-more inclusive-vision of trade disputes that recognizes
other goals.75 Benedict Kingsbury, in his illuminating analysis of the
foundations of international trade and environmental law, undertakes
69. See Environment Committee Unlikely to Propose Rule Changes at WTO Meeting,
Official Says, 19 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 827 (Oct. 2, 1996) (paraphrasing remarks of Stuart
Eizenstat, United States Under-Secretary of Commerce for International Trade).
70. See EsTy, supra note 64, at 77-83; C. FORD RUNGE, FREER TRADE, PROTECTED
ENVIRONMENT: BALANCING TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS 100-07
(1994).
71. See Steve Charnovitz, The Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23
ENVTL. L. 475, 512-57 (1993).
72. See EsTY, supra note 64, at 98. Daniel Esty finds even "radical surgery" to the
environmental exception clauses of the GATT to be unlikely. He therefore considers the
possibility of reinterpretation of existing language as an alternative strategy to heightened
environmental sensitivity. See id. at 205; see also, Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Or-
ganization and Social Issues, 28 J. WORLD TRADE L. 17, 19 (1994).
73. See G.A. Res. 43/196, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49 at 147, U.N. Doc. A/
43/49 (1989).
74. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention
on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818; United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 849; Agenda 21, Annex II in, 1 REPORT OF U.N. CONF. ON ENV'T & DEV. at 9, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.151/26.Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.8 (1993) [hereinafter UNCED RE-
PORT]; Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus
on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests,
Annex I in, UNCED REPORT, at 480 (1993).
75. See generally G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and the International Relations
Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829 (1995).
1998]
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY
a reevaluation of the nature and role of states and inter-state institu-
tions. He offers a conceptually different liberal paradigm for interna-
tional law that would include non-state actors advancing
environmental protection. 76 He proposes a "theory of state in a legal
system" that accommodates groups and individuals, rather than a
"legal system of states . . . ." However, Kingsbury concedes that the
chances of such a radical transformation are not promising in the short
term. In these circumstances, he opts for an incremental greening
within the GATT/WTO.
77
It is worth noting that trade sanctions are insignificant when com-
pared to the gross violations of free trade that occur with impunity.
Governments frequently act "as downright protectionists on some oc-
casions and as mercantilists78 almost as a matter of course. '79 Their
main purpose is not to liberalize trade but to pry open the markets of
other countries for exports. This is evident in a number of areas in-
cluding shipping, financial services, the movement of natural persons,
and telecommunications.
The problems appear to be looming even larger in the future, and
many reputable commentators think that free trade will sorely be put
to the test with regard to liberalizing trade in goods and services, the
admission of China into the WTO, foreign investment, competition
policy, labor standards, and the creation of protectionist regional trad-
ing agreements.80 To the extent that IEL treaties offer a convenient
red herring and an easy target for a free trade regime eager to divert
attention from its problems, there is reason to fear that environmental
reforms of GATriWTO will be resolutely resisted. It is time to look
beyond GATT/IWTO.
II
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROMISE OF UNCLOS
Those concerned with fairness and justice in trade and environ-
ment disputes should look instead at UNCLOS, which came into force
on November 16, 1994.81 UNCLOS, as former U.S. Secretary of
State, Warren Christopher, pointed out in a letter of submittal to the
President, "[i]s the strongest comprehensive environmental treaty
76. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, the World Trade Organi-
zation, and the Liberal Project to Reconceptualize International Law, 1994 Y.B. INr'L
ENVTL. L. 1.
77. See id. at 40.
78. Mercantilists believe that foreign trade should be regulated to create a surplus of
exports over imports. IX OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 617 (2d ed. 1989).
79. All Free Traders Now?, 341 ECONOMIST 21 (Dec. 7, 1996).
80. See id. at 22-23.
81. See UNCLOS, supra note 4.
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now in existence or likely to emerge for quite some time,' 82 and can
be the foundation of a "Constitution for the Oceans." Its 59 provi-
sions obligating environmental protection and conservation, out of
320 in all, possess a fundamental and over-arching character.
83
UNCLOS deals with conservation and the management of living re-
sources, pollution prevention, reduction and control, vessel pollution,
and environmental management. It can be asserted that UNCLOS is
not only a treaty but a codification and articulation of the present
state of the rules applicable to oceans, and it has ascended to the sta-
tus of customary IEL, binding on both signatories and non-
signatories.
84
In this context, it is worth remembering that the oceans occupy
over seventy percent of the earth and are in many ways a proxy for
the global environment. The fact that most pollution finds its way into
the oceans through direct and indirect pathways from land 85 requires
control of "land-based pollution" with measures directed at air, land,
and water pollution. Furthermore, notable areas of oceanic govern-
ance, including the conservation of wetlands, coastal areas, and bi-
odiversity, are among the most critical issues confronting international
environmental protection in general. As former Secretary of State
Christopher noted,86 UNCLOS is the strongest and most comprehen-
sive environmental treaty now in existence.
87
82. Warren Christopher, Letter of Submittal of the Secretary of State to the President of
the United States, in Message from the President of the United States and Commentary Ac-
companying the Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Agreement Relating to
the Implementation of Part XI upon their Transmittal to the United States Senate for its
Advice and Consent, reprinted in 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 77, 81 (1994) [hereinafter
Letter of Submittal].
83. This article rejects a narrow view of UNCLOS authority given UNCLOS' broad
environmental mandate. See, e.g., Richard J. McLaughlin, UNCLOS and the Demise of the
United States' Use of Trade Sanctions to Protect Dolphins, Sea Turtles, Whales, and Other
International Marine Living Resources, 21 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1 (1994), (arguing that UN-
CLOS will restrict actions by states such as the United States to protect the international
environment). McLaughlin's view is based on a misconception about the reach of UN-
CLOS. As alluded to in this section, UNCLOS incorporates an extensive and inclusive
mandate, not a restrictive or confining one. Cf Jonathan I. Charney, Entry Into Force of
the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 381, 391 (1995).
84. See Martin H. Belsky, The Ecosystem Model Mandate for a Comprehensive United
States Ocean Policy and Law of the Sea, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 417, 470 (1989).
85. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REPORT
ON THE STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 71 (1991).
86. See Christopher, Letter of Submittal supra note 82, at 81.
87. UNCLOS contains several environmental provisions that range from the global to
the specific, and that spread out over several parts of the text: Territorial sea and contigu-
ous zone (Part II); Exclusive economic zone (Part V); High seas (Part VII); Enclosed or
semi-enclosed areas (Part IX); The Area (Part XI); Protection and preservation of the




While UNCLOS does not create a World Oceanic Organization,
its dispute resolution provisions are stronger and more binding than
those of the GATT/WTO. Even if the primacy of UNCLOS's dispute
resolution is in issue, the undoubted jurisdiction of an UNCLOS tribu-
nal-as opposed to a GATT/WTO tribunal-could be invoked to set-
tle disputes involving environmental actions that are sanctioned by
UNCLOS but contrary to GATT/WTO trade law.
88
One of the dominant characteristics of UNCLOS is that it is an
umbrella agreement that brings other international rules, regulations
and implementing bodies within its canopy. Many of UNCLOS's pro-
visions are of a constitutional or general character and will be aug-
mented by specific regulations, rules and implementing procedures
formulated by other international agreements and by nation states.
Article 197 illustrates the inclusive core of UNCLOS. It com-
mands that:
States shall co-operate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a re-
gional basis, directly or through competent international organiza-
tions, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards
and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Con-
vention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environ-
ment, taking into account characteristic regional features.
89
When Article 197 is read in conjunction with Articles 237 and 293,
UNCLOS's encompassing extent is clear beyond a doubt. Article 237
deals with obligations under other conventions that protect and pre-
serve the environment and elucidates that the provisions of UNCLOS
themselves are "[w]ithout prejudice to the specific obligations as-
sumed by states under special conventions and agreements concluded
previously which relate to the protection and preservation of the
marine environment and to agreements which may be concluded in
furtherance of the general principles set forth in this Convention." 90
Having made this point, it goes on to clarify that: "[s]pecific obliga-
tions assumed by States ... should be carried out in a manner consis-
tent with the general principles and objectives of this Convention." 91
It is worthy of note that Article 237 covers both past and future agree-
ments, holding that they should be implemented in a manner consis-
tent with UNCLOS' general principles.
Significant IEL treaties-antithetical to GATT as it transpires-
are an important part of the design, environmental objective, and ar-
chitecture of UNCLOS. Not only are many of the specific obligations
assumed in these IEL treaties "consistent" with UNCLOS, they are an
88. See supra Part I.B. and I.C.
89. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 197.
90. See id. art. 237, para. 1.
91. See id. art. 237, para. 2.
[Vol. 25:189
UNCLOS & ENVIRONMENT DISPUTES
integral and necessary part of UNCLOS's environmental umbrella.
Pursuant to this legal scheme, Article 293 declares that an UNCLOS
tribunal shall "[a]pply this Convention and other rules of international
law not incompatible with this Convention.
92
A scenario is emerging that is remarkably different from the
GATT/WTO. It appears that UNCLOS tribunals will be interpreting
and applying a formidable number of environmental provisions whose
objective is to advance international environmental protection and
not to liberalize trade. In dramatic contrast, GATT/WTO dispute set-
tlement bodies-set up to implement a regime of liberal trade-are
uncertain about IEL and diminish environmental protection even




This Part will test the accuracy of the preliminary impression of
the applicability of UNCLOS by examining the four international
agreements referred to in Part I.93 The analysis in this Part demon-
strates the extent to which international environmental protection
may be advanced through trade measures against parties to UN-
CLOS-even against non-parties to the four treaties mentioned in the
discussion.
A. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer
The Montreal Protocol (Protocol) was first negotiated in 1987
and substantially revised in 1990.94 It provides for the elimination of
chloro-floro carbons (CFCs) and other chemicals harmful to the
ozone layer by the year 2000. Some scientists predict that ozone layer
depletion could significantly alter aquatic ecosystems and affect
aquatic food chains. It may also lead to potential increases in hydro-
gen peroxide, an acid rain precursor.95 The Protocol relies on trade
sanctions, restricting parties from trading in CFCs and CFC related
products with non-parties.
96
92. See id. art. 293, para. 1.
93. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
94. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 10, 26 I.L.M. at 1550.
95. See John Warren Kindt & Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The Vexing Problem of Ozone
Depletion in International Environmental Law and Policy, 24 TEX. INT'L L.J. 261, 266
(I9g9).
96. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 10, art. 4, 26 I.L.M. at 1554. The Protocol regu-
lated trade with non-parties, subject to stipulated procedures, in three ways. First, it
banned the import and export of controlled substances from non-parties. Second, it
banned imports of products containing controlled substances. Third, after a feasibility
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These restrictions were included, after extensive discussion, pri-
marily because it would be unfair for parties to internalize the cost of
not using CFCs while non-parties benefitted by the absence of such a
burden. The trade restrictions sought to encourage countries to par-
ticipate in the Protocol and to discourage industries that produce and
use CFCs from migrating to non-party CFC havens. 97 A number of
commentators feel that these trade restrictions continue to play a ma-
jor role in preserving the integrity of the Protocol.98 Under GAT/
WTO, the import and export ban on non-parties appears to violate
GATr's nondiscrimination obligations, while import restrictions on
products made with, but not containing, CFCs would run afoul of the
GATT rules relating to production and process methods.99 The extent
to which these restrictions may be justified under UNCLOS will de-
pend on the extent to which the CFC restrictions are environmental
control measures that protect the marine environment from pollution
and help to conserve oceanic resources. While the answer to this
question cannot be conclusive without closer examination, a reason-
ably strong case can be made for bringing CFCs under the UNCLOS
umbrella.
Under Article 192, states must protect and preserve the marine
environment by eliminating sources of marine pollution, including
land-based sources. UNCLOS defines pollution to include the intro-
duction into the marine environment of substances or energy that are
likely to result in harm to living resources and marine life.1°° UN-
CLOS recognizes the integrated nature of the bio-physical environ-
ment and the fact that much pollution eventually finds its way into the
marine environment. It deals generally with land-based pollution and
specifically with atmospheric pollution. The need to protect the
marine environment is underlined by the goal that pollution control
measures should "[m]inimize to the fullest possible extent (a) the re-
lease of toxic, harmful or noxious substances ...from land based
sources ... from or through the atmosphere ...."101
study, it banned imports from non-parties of substances made with, but not containing,
controlled substances. Id. at 1555.
97. See Report of the ad hoc Working Group on the Work of its Third Session, U.N.
Environment Programme at 17-18, UNEP/WG.172/2 (1987).
98. See, e.g., Robert Housman & Durwood Zaelke, Trade, Environment, and Sustain-
able Development: A Primer, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 535, 580 (1992). This
Article does not address whether such economic trade sanctions are successful. The gen-
eral view, certainly in the United States, is that trade sanctions are the single most effective
way of forcing foreign nations to adopt stricter environmental standards. There appears to
be evidence either way. The literature is reviewed in McLaughlin, supra note 83, at 25-29.
99. See also, CTE Report, supra note 23, para. 25.
100. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 1, para. 1(4).
101. Id. art. 194, paras. 3 & n.3(a).
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When addressing land-based pollution, UNCLOS instructs states
"[t]o establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended
practices and procedures . . ." through competent international orga-
nizations or diplomatic conferences. 02 Article 212 discusses atmos-
pheric pollution and bears close examination. First, it requires states
to reduce marine pollution from or through the atmosphere by adopt-
ing laws and regulations "[a]pplicable to the air space under their sov-
ereignty ... taking account of internationally agreed upon rules.'
0 3
Second, "[s]tates shall take other measures as may be necessary to
prevent, reduce and control such pollution. States, acting especially
through competent international organizations or diplomatic confer-
ence, shall endeavor to establish global and regional rules ... to pre-
vent, reduce and control such pollution.'
10 4
A question that arises is whether "such pollution" refers only to
pollution within the air under the sovereignty of states, or more gener-
ally, to atmospheric pollution. The latter interpretation is the more
reasonable. First, atmospheric pollution is the subject of Article 212.
Second, internationally agreed upon rules applicable to the air space
of states are dealt with in Article 212(1); the mention in Article 212(1)
makes a second reference redundant. Third, the distinction drawn by
Article 212 between the enforcement of rules within the sovereign ter-
ritory of states, and "[o]ther measures as may be necessary to prevent,
reduce and control such pollution" suggests that "such pollution" re-
fers to atmospheric pollution.105
Protection of the ozone layer comes within the scope of UN-
CLOS Articles 192 and 212 to the degree that ozone layer depletion
harms the marine environment.
B. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wildlife and Fauna (CITES)
CITES, a treaty entered into after UNCLOS, contains specific
environmental obligations that are brought within the obligatory um-
brella of UNCLOS by Article 237. CITES, along with a clutch of
other international agreements, responded to the threatened loss of
global biodiversity. CITES is distinguished by its recognition that the
primary threat of extinction to certain plants and animals arises from
the fact they are over-exploited through international trade.10 6
102. Id. art. 207, para. 4.
103. Id. art. 212, para. 1.
104. Id. art. 212, paras. 2 & 3 (emphasis added).
105. Id. art. 212, para. 2.
106. "The Contracting States ... recognizing.., that international cooperation is es-
sential for the protection of certain species of wild fauna and flora against over-exploita-
tion through international trade [are] convinced of the urgency of taking appropriate
measures . . . ." CITES, supra note 11, pmbl.
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CITES responds to this threat by controlling or eliminating such
trade.
CITES protections are proportional to perceived threats, estab-
lishing corresponding levels of trade restrictions through a listing sys-
tem. 10 7 UNCLOS recognizes, in Article 194(5), that pollution
prevention activities "[s]hall include those necessary to protect and
preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted,
threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life.'
10 8
The obligation to preserve implies an affirmative duty to maintain and
improve the marine environment in addition to a limited duty to pre-
vent prospective damage.' 0 9 Consequently, CITES can be construed
to fall within the regulatory structure of UNCLOS." 0 Commentators
have rightly observed that these articles may establish a broad affirm-
ative duty for all states to protect and preserve threatened and endan-
gered species, their ecosystems and their habitats."' To the extent
that CITES protects non-domestic species through trade restrictions,
such action would be contrary to GATT, as interpreted by the Tuna/
Dolphin Panel Report." 2 UNCLOS pollution provisions are comple-
mented by CITES provisions dealing with the conservation and man-
agement of living resources. For example, CITES Article 61, at
paragraphs 2 and 4 requires states not to endanger living resources. In
a similar vein, CITES Articles 65 and 120 deal with the protection of
marine mammals, such as whales, in states' exclusive economic zones
(EEZ) and on the high seas. They empower states and international
107. CITES listing system consists of three appendices. See CITES, supra, note 11,
apps. I, II & III.
108. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 194, para. 5.
109. See 4 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY
40 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 1991).
110. The pollution regime of UNCLOS protects marine species. The pollution provi-
sions include, first, the definition of marine pollution, which embraces actions that result or
are likely to result in harm to living resources and marine life. Article 192 drives home the
point that pollution protection is a component segment of environmental preservation.
Specifically, Article 192 articulates a duty to protect and preserve the marine environment.
See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art, 192.
111. See generally Craig S. Harrison, Costs to the United States in Environmental Pro-
tection and Marine Scientific Research by Not Joining the Law of the Sea Convention, in
CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CON-
VENTION 425, 426 (Jon M. Van Dyke ed., 1985). But see McLaughlin, supra note 83, at 39-
40, for a contrary view. However, McLaughlin's article, (uncharacteristically for such an
outstanding and exceptionally well researched article), ignores the definition of marine
pollution in UNCLOS, argues that species protection is not included in the protection of
the marine environment under Part XII, and deals with pollution, not natural resource
protection. This approach is erroneous because the UNCLOS definition of pollution refers
specifically to "harm to living resources and marine life." Moreover, other provisions of
UNCLOS indicate that environmental protection under UNCLOS part XII includes pro-
tection of marine life. See id. at 40, n.222.
112. See Tuna I, supra note 29, para. 5.26. The Panel in Tuna II took a different view.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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organizations to prohibit, limit, or regulate the exploitation of marine
mammals more strictly than provided for in UNCLOS. In addition,
CITES Article 197 embodies a general duty to cooperate for the pro-
tection and preservation of the marine environment, while UNCLOS
Article 118 imposes a specific duty to cooperate regarding conserva-
tion of high seas living resources. Some commentators have argued
that this amounts to a pactum de negotiando obligating parties to ne-
gotiate with a view to reaching agreement on necessary measures."
3
CITES Article 197 and UNCLOS Article 118 must be read in
light of UNCLOS Article 237, which states that the provisions of UN-
CLOS part XII are "without prejudice ... to agreements which may
be concluded in furtherance of the general principles set forth in this
Convention.""n 4 There can be little doubt that CITES is a previously
concluded special agreement under UNCLOS Article 237, and that
the trade embargo provisions of CITES should be "carried out in a
manner consistent with the general principles and objectives" of
UNCLOS.
115
Admittedly, the CITES ban on the trade of non-marine species
will come within the jurisdiction of UNCLOS only if marine and non-
marine species share common habitats or are interdependent on each
other. Where marine species are concerned, UNCLOS is possessed of
authority over, for example, a trade ban on marine species. At the
least, this jurisdiction removes such an issue from the exclusive control
of the GATT/WTO.
As we have seen, the GATT panel roundly rejected the argument
of the U.S. in Tuna II, which was based on CITES justification.
116
That panel refused to acknowledge that CITES or any other environ-
mental treaty, unless it was subsequent to GATT, and accepted by all
its contracting parties, would be relevant, even as an interpretive re-
source. On the other hand, an UNCLOS forum would recognize,
rather than ignore, the very same provisions.
C. The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
(Basel Convention)
Modern industrial societies generate massive quantities of wastes
that contain significant quantities of hazardous substances. These haz-
113. See Ivan A. Shearer, High Seas: Drift Gillnets, Highly Migratory Species, and
Marine Mammals, in THE LAW OF THE SEA IN THE 1990s: A FRAMEwORK FOR FURTHER
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 237, 243-46 (Tadao KuTibayashi & Edward L. Miles eds.,
1992).
114. See supra note 90 and accompanying text; UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 237, para. 1.
115. See supra note 91 and accompanying text; UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 237, para. 2.
116. See notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
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ardous wastes must be treated, stored, neutralized or otherwise dis-
posed in a manner that does not adversely affect humans or the
environment. In most developed countries stringent pollution control
laws rigorously govern the manner in which hazardous wastes may be
disposed. The costs of such measures can be extremely high, and sites
for storage have become painfully scarce.
The unavailability of domestic sites, as well as the high costs of
disposal, has led industries in developed countries to export such
wastes to developing countries. 117 Trading in hazardous wastes might
well be an archetypal example of the advantages of free trade based
on comparative advantage. Richer countries need to dispose of their
wastes but lack sites, while poor countries possess sites and do not see
the necessity for stringent laws controlling or restricting their use. It
makes sense for the poorer countries to trade sites, in which they pos-
sess an advantage, for desperately needed money, technology, or ex-
pertise in which rich countries possess an advantage. Such trading
transactions in which poorer countries trade their comparative advan-
tage in sites for adequate payment by richer countries make both par-
ties better off. Some economists argue that the world's poor should
be helped now and point out that the benefits accruing to present and
future generations by improving infrastructure and educating children
can outweigh the costs of any pollution that may result.
118
On the other hand, the Basel Convention recognizes that envi-
ronmental damage can arise from trade in hazardous wastes. Its
objectives are to prevent pollution, first, by controlling the generation
of wastes, and second, by requiring the "environmentally sound man-
agement" of hazardous wastes. 119 The Convention recognizes that in-
ternational trade in hazardous wastes can thwart its objectives and
seeks to control such trade. It promotes the notion that hazardous
waste should, as far as compatible with environmentally sound man-
agement, be disposed of in the state where it was generated. The
transboundary movement of such wastes is strictly controlled, so not
to endanger human health and the environment.
The movement of hazardous wastes is permitted under the Basel
Convention in only three circumstances 120 and both importing' 2' and
117. See The Bamaro Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, 29 Jan
1991 30 I.L.M. 775 (1991); The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 22 March 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989).
118. See Lawrence H. Summers, Summers on Sustainable Growth, 323 ECONOMIsr 65
(May 30, 1992).
119. See Basel Convention, supra note 12, pmbl & art. 4, para. 2(a)-(h).
120. These circumstances include the following situations: 1) the exporting party lacks
the capacity, facilities or siting to ensure the environmentally sound disposal of wastes; 2)
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exporting 2 2 countries must ensure that wastes are managed in an en-
vironmentally sound manner. Predictably, these provisions could vio-
late GATTWITO provisions on a number of the grounds reviewed
above.123 To begin, a ban on trade with non-parties to the treaty is
GATT discriminatory. The "most favored nation" clause in GATT
1947 Article 1 provides that a nation extending a trade advantage to
another nation must immediately and unconditionally extend that ad-
vantage to all other member nations. Next, health, safety or conserva-
tion concerns could justify a Basel Convention ban by one GATI'
nation on another nation that is not a party to the Basel Convention.
However, it would be difficult to come within the "necessary" require-
ment, or show that the ban was primarily aimed at conservation,
health or safety. Indeed, in light of the case law, it would be ex-
tremely difficult for an exporting country to satisfy Article XX in light
of the Basel Convention's extraterritorial objective of protecting the
welfare and environment of importing countries. Indeed, the Basel
Convention's extraterritorial feature may preclude it from claiming
the Article XX exceptions. Finally, it could be argued that controls of
hazardous wastes are aimed at process and production and not at
products.
However, the view from UNCLOS is substantially different. To
begin, UNCLOS Article 195 incorporates two foundational principles
that were strengthened and built upon in the Basel Convention. Arti-
cle 195 states that "[s]tates shall act so as not to transfer, directly or
indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to another or transform
one type of pollution into another.'12 4 The reach of Article 195 is
substantial.
First, Article 195 institutionalizes a prohibition on transfers or ex-
ports of hazardous materials. The underlying rationale is that the pro-
ducer of waste should neutralize the waste at the source instead of
pushing the waste around. The Basel Convention recognizes the man-
ifest dangers of hazardous waste and sets up safeguards against trans-
boundary movements of hazardous wastes. In doing so, it is develop-
ing a principle already found in UNCLOS Article 195.
Second, Article 195 is alive to the dangers of transforming pollu-
tion. Unfortunately, both pollution transfers and transformations are
exacerbated by the basic law of physics that matter is indestructible-
it does not go away. The initial destination of pollutants may be al-
the wastes are required as raw material or recovery material by the importing country; or
3) the shipment is in accordance with the convention. See id. art. 4, para. 9(a)-(c).
121. See id. art. 4, para. 2(g).
122. See id. art. 4, paras. 2(e) & 8.
123. See supra Part I.A.
124. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 195 (emphasis added).
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tered, but ultimately they reenter the flow of materials within the en-
vironment. Modern pollution laws that fragment the environment
into air, land, and water have created a legacy of transformations and
transfers. 125 Discharge limitations in one medium, such as air, often
do little more than shift the pollution from air to land without recog-
nizing the adverse impact of the transfers. Thus, control technologies
aimed at achieving specific pollution limits generate new residual
streams in other media.
For example, the provisions of the United States Clean Air Act
(CAA) directed at reducing sulfur dioxide by the use of "scrub-
bers"'126 in smoke stacks create massive quantities of sludge.' 27 The
EPA estimated that three to six tons of scrubber sludge may be pro-
duced for each ton of sulfur dioxide removed from the flue gas.
128
Consequently, the problem of sulfur dioxide in the air is replaced by
the problem of sludge disposal.
Direct transfers are compounded by indirect transfers that result
from physical, chemical, and biological forces.1 29 Atmospheric
desposition problems are illustrated by acid rain phenomena. 130 In
125. "Industrial Ecology," a relatively new approach to environmental policymaking,
aims at a more comprehensive approach to questions of waste. For a historical introduc-
tion to the roots and development of Industrial Ecology, see generally Charles W. Powers
& Marian R. Chertow, Industrial Ecology: Overcoming Policy Fragmentation, in THINKING
ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, 19, (Daniel C.
Esty & Marian R. Chertow eds., 1997).
126. The Clean Air Act provides that new coal-fired electricity generators should use
"the best system of emission reduction ...." 42 U.S.C.A. 7411(a)(1). EPA has endorsed
the use of scrubbers for this purpose. See 37 Fed. Reg. 5768-69 (1972). See also Sierra
Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 317 n.38 (1981), (citing and interpreting Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7411).
127. Scrubbers work by spraying lime and water solutions on exhaust gases as they
flow up power plant smokestacks. Sulfur dioxide in the exhaust gases react with the spray
and is later removed, strained and disposed as sludge. See Bruce Ackerman & William
Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1491 n.56
(1980) (citing 2 EPA, FLUE GAS DESULFURIZATION SYSTEM CAPABILITIES FOR COAL-
FIRED STEAM GENERATORS 3-2 to 3-8, EPA Pub. No.600/7-78-032b (1978)).
128. See CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, CONTROLLING CROsS-MEDIA POLLUTANTS 8-9
(1984) [hereinafter CROSS-MEDIA POLLUTANTS].
129. See id. at 14-20. Physical processes include leaching, volatilization and deposition.
Leaching occurs when pollutants, particularly toxins, dissolve and percolate or move from
waste disposal sites into groundwater. Volatilization is the process of vaporization that
shifts pollutants from land or water to the air. Deposition is the transfer of pollutants from
the air to land and water.
130. Acid rain, or more accurately acid deposition, results from the emissions into the
atmosphere primarily of sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and to a lesser extent, hydrocar-
bons. Sulfur dioxide (SO 2 gives rise to the greatest concern, both as a gas and as a trans-
formed product (sulfate) because of its volume and its interactive properties. SO 2, is
largely produced by the burning of coal containing sulfur in power generation and smelting
processes and the combustion of other fossil fuels by industrial, commercial and residential
users. Nitrogen oxides are also emitted by the combustion of fossil fuels at high tempera-
tures. The main sources of man-made nitrogen oxides are motor vehicles and fossil fuel
power plants. See THE NATIONAL ACID PRECIPITATION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM
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the Chesapeake Bay, where excessive nutrients are a major problem,
twenty-five percent of human-generated nitrogen reaches the bay
through atmospheric nitrate deposition.13' Toxics are also transported
through the atmosphere. In 1981, estimates showed that air deposi-
tion accounted for ninety percent of polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs) entering the Great Lakes' Lake Superior.1 32 Furthermore, a
pollutant's chemical structure may change as it moves through the en-
vironment.a33 Biological processes in which microorganisms break
down toxic compounds also present new combinations of problems.
134
In sum, the process of transformation may lead to ocean pollution
through unidentifiable pathways that make it more difficult to protect
the marine environment. In the absence of measures of the kind set
out in the Basel Convention, hazardous materials exported from one
country may find themselves dumped into the territorial seas of the
importing nation, or spread on land. Burial in insufficiently lined pits
or trenches leads to atmospheric pollution. The appendices of the Ba-
sel Convention make it clear that these are possible methods of dispo-
sal,135 while the provisions of UNCLOS seek to prevent pollution of
the oceans.' 36 As we have seen, UNCLOS Article 197 encourages
states to draw up rules that mandate cooperation to formulate inter-
national rules and organizations consistent with UNCLOS's goals.
UNCLOS Article 237 applies this to agreements concluded before or
after the signing of UNCLOS.
D. The Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long
Driftnets in the South Pacific
137
"Driftnet fishing" or "driftnetting" is a particularly harmful form
of commercial net fishing.
(NAPAP), 1 INTERIM ASSESSMENT: Ti CAUSES AND EFFECTs OF AcIDIc DEPOSITION
[ExEcuTIvE SUrMMARY] 3 (1987) [hereinafter NAPAP: VOL. 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].
131. DIANE FISHER, ET AL., POLLUTED COASTAL WATERS: THE ROLE OF ACID RAIN
63 (1988). The atmosphere serves as a transfer medium for volatilized fertilizers and
manure. See id. at 15-16, 58.
132. See Frances Irwin, Introduction to Integrated Pollution Control, in, INTEGRATED
POLLUTION CONTROL IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 3, 22 (Nigel Haigh & Frances
Irwin eds., 1990).
133. For example, sulfur dioxide transforms into sulfate through several different
chemical processes, while sunlight acting on unburned hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides
creates smog. See CLIMATE SYSTEM MODELING 226, 232, 236 (Kevin E. Trenberth ed.,
1992).
134. For example, microorganisms can change mercury into the highly toxic methyl
mercury, while toxins can accumulate in fish even though water concentrations have been
reduced. See HOWARD A. BRIDGMAN, GLOBAL AIR POLLUTION: PROBLEMS FOR THE
1990s 138, 197 (1990).
135. See Basel Convention, supra note 12, Annex IV.
136. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 194, para. 3(a) & art. 210.
137. South Pacific Convention, supra note 13.
1998]
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY
It is to be distinguished from "setnet fishing," which relies on fish
swimming. into nets . . . [and] can be made to isolate the particular
species they are intended to catch. Driftnets, which are suspended in
the water like giant curtains and strung out as a wall for many miles,
drift across the open ocean and indiscriminately catch everything in
their path. A single boat ... can have up to 40 miles of such nets
going down to a depth of about 48 feet below the surface of the ocean
in a single positioning, and typically several vessels of a driftnet fleet
will work together to fish in this manner. At its height in any given
fishing season ... up to 22,500 miles of deep nets [drift] through the
waters of the Pacific and Indian oceans each night-enough to stretch
more than once around the Earth. Driftnet fishing . . . is sometimes
called "wall of death" fishing because it kills most living things in its
path. Whatever they catch, driftnets kill or maim. Marine creatures in
search of food and lured by the fish already caught in the net, swim or
dive into the webbing where they become entangled. If they do not
drown or manage to escape they may suffer for several months before
dying from injury, starvation, or both.
138
Driftnet fishing often leads to a rate of catch that exceeds the
breeding capability of many species that are caught and killed by it.
In the ten years in which driftnets had been used prior to the morato-
rium, they had been held responsible for the near collapse of the alba-
core tuna fishery in the South Pacific and had contributed to the
serious decline of the North American salmon fishery.139 In view of
these findings, the General Assembly of the United Nations recom-
mended a moratorium on the use of large scale pelagic driftnets in
high seas fishing.1
40
The South Pacific Convention prohibits its nationals and vessels
documented under its laws from engaging in driftnet fishing within the
South Pacific.14 ' t also directs parties to engage in extensive reprisals
against driftnet catches of non-parties, including the prohibition of im-
ports of fish and fish products, processed or not, which were caught
using a driftnet.142 Moreover, it directs parties to take further actions
138. LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
WORLD ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 747 (1994).
139. See id. at 748; see also Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact on the
Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, G.A. Res. 225, U.N. GAOR,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/225 (1989); 29 I.L.M. 1555, para. 4(b) [hereinafter 1989 UN Driftnet
Resolution]; Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine Re-
sources of the World's Oceans and Seas, U.N. Doc. AIRES/44/215 (1991), 31 I.L.M. 241
[hereinafter 1991 UN Driftnet Resolution]. Other scholars argue that this view ignores the
scientific evidence. See, e.g., William T. Burke, et al., United Nations Resolutions on
Driftnet Fishing: An Unsustainable Precedent for High Seas and Coastal Fisheries Manage-
ment, 25 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 127, 128 (1994).
140. See 1989 UN Driftnet Resolution, supra note 139, para. 4(a).
141. See South Pacific Convention, supra note 13, art. 2.
142. See id. art. 3, para. 2.
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against .non-parties. These actions include the prohibition of landing,
processing and importing driftnet catches, and the prohibition of the
possession of driftnets and the restriction of port access. 143 The con-
vention also empowers parties to take even stricter measures than
those expressly required.
144
The South Pacific Convention is an unmistakable offspring of
UNCLOS, borrowing many of its provisions. A cluster of UNCLOS
provisions are of particular applicability to driftnets on the high seas
based upon the obligations of fishing states to the wider international
community.145 They deal with the duty to take the necessary meas-
ures to conserve the living resources of the high seas.146 This duty
codifies the customary law crystallized in Article 1, paragraph 2 of the
1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the High Seas 147 and the International Court of Justice dec-
laration that a high seas fishing state has an obligation to take full
account of fishery conservation "[flor the benefit of all."'
1 48
UNCLOS obligates signatories to cooperate with others to con-
serve marine resources 149 and to contribute and exchange scientific
information, catch and effort statistics, and other data regarding con-
servation of stocks on the high seas.1 50 More important is the duty to
take measures "[d]esigned on the best scientific evidence available to
the states concerned to maintain or restore populations of harvested
species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield as
qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors.. ,"151 and
to observe the treaty obligations that the signatories have under-
taken.1 52 Despite the fact that the South Pacific Convention is a
treaty that falls within the protective umbrella of UNCLOS, it is not
signed by all parties to the GATT. For that reason, any trade action
taken under the South Pacific Convention to prohibit or restrict fish
caught with driftnets could not be justified under the Article XX
exceptions.
A picture of substantive law emerges from the interaction of IEL
treaties that is substantially different from that found in GATT.
143. See id.
144. See id. art. 3, para. 3.
145. What follows is based largely on William T. Burke, The Law of the Sea Concern-
ing Coastal State Authority Over Driftnets on the High Seas, in UNITED NATIONS FOOD
AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, FAO LEGISLATIVE STUDY 47: THE REGULATION OF
DRIFrNET FISHING ON THE HIGH SEAS: LEGAL ISSUES, 13 (1991).
146. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 61 & 117.
147. See Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 140 T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (1966).
148. See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 31 (July 25).
149. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 118.
150. See id. art 119, para. 2.
151. Id. art 119, para. l(a).
152. See id. art 116.
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States can apply the provisions of the Montreal Protocol, CITES, and
the Basel Convention under the protective umbrella of UNCLOS.
Consequently, the UNCLOS dispute settlement procedures, not those
of GATT/WTO, become the proper forum for vindicating such
actions.
IV
ADJUDICATING TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT DISPUTES
Very few international disputes lead to adjudication because the
international community has generally avoided the compulsory judi-
cial settlement of disputes. There is little doubt that the absence of
compulsory judicial settlement is a serious weakness in the embryonic
legal system prevailing in international society. It is in this context
that GATT/WTO has assumed prominence as a unique system of
compulsory and binding dispute settlement. The attention given to
GATT!/WTO appears to have ignored the equally compulsory and
binding dispute settlement procedures under UNCLOS, as well as the
more limited, but nonetheless significant jurisdiction of the ICJ. A
brief comparison of the jurisdictions of these two institutions demon-
strates the extent to which trade and environment disputes could be
adjudicated by UNCLOS tribunals, while the substantive law of UN-
CLOS could, in certain circumstances, be applied by the ICJ.
A. Dispute Settlement Under GATT/WTO
GATr/WTO has aspired to settle all trade related disputes under
its jurisprudential canopy. Under the Panel System, which prevailed
up to 1994, Panel decisions required affirmative approval by the
GATT and were subject to single member veto power. The 1994
DSU 153 removed this weakness and advanced judicial hegemony by
establishing a judicial type dispute settlement system in contrast to the
earlier less binding, more consensus oriented, system under the
GATT. The Understanding ensures that all dispute settlement proce-
dures under the GATT, the Subsidies Code, and a variety of other
trade related agreements (Covered Agreements)154 are brought
within a single dispute resolution process overseen by the Dispute Set-
tlement Body (DSB).155 Where consultation fails, the dispute settle-
153. The DSU consists of 27 articles and 4 appendices. See DSU supra note 3. A
central purpose of the DSU is to confer security and predictability of outcomes on the
workings of the WTO. See DSU, art. 3(2).
154. See DSU, arts. 1(1) & 2(1).
155. DSU art. 2.1. The single dispute resolution system ends the potential for forum
shopping that existed within the old GATT. The heart of the new system is the DSB's
authorization to establish panels, adopt panel and appellate reports, maintain surveillance
of implementation of rulings and recommendations and authorize retaliatory measures
where States do not implement panel recommendations. See generally DSU supra note 3.
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ment procedure may be activated; the findings of the Panel, subject to
appeal and upon acceptance by the Dispute Settlement Body, are
binding on the parties.
B. Dispute Settlement Under UNCLOS
The Dispute Settlement Provisions of UNCLOS share GATT/
WTO's objective of institutionalizing procedures that lead to certainty
and security of outcome. Both treaties recognize the impossibility of
achieving such goals in the face of destabilizing unilateral interpreta-
tion and actions. 156 Like GAIT/WTO, UNCLOS allows parties the
opportunity of settling disputes by peaceful means of their own choice
at any time.
157
UNCLOS's dispute settlement provisions are divided into three
sections of part XV.158 Section one contains seven articles' 59 compris-
ing the general provisions, with an emphasis placed upon the peaceful
settlement of disputes pursuant to Article 33 of the Charter of the
United Nations (UN Charter). 160 State parties can make general, re-
gional or bilateral agreements providing alternative procedures to
those laid out in UNCLOS, provided that any dispute is submitted to
a procedure that entails a binding decision. 161 This unique provision
allows state parties the freedom to choose the method of interpreta-
tion and dispute procedure most compatible with the parties' needs.
Conciliation between parties to a dispute is also a part of UNCLOS's
settlement provisions. 162 If no settlement can be reached by any
When a dispute arises, the DSB encourages Member States to follow a consultation
procedure that emphasizes open dialogue and discourse between the parties and interested
Member States. See id. art. 4.1-4.6, 4.11. On the other hand, the Member State may elect
the DSB dispute settlement procedure where consultation proves unavailing. See id. art.
4.7-4.8.
A request from a Member State activates the dispute settlement procedure. The DSB
then establishes a well qualified panel to hear the case, (unless there is a consensus not to
do so). See id. art. 5, 6.1, 8.1. The panel examines the matter in light of the relevant
provisions of the covered agreements cited by the parties to the dispute. See id., art. 7.
After careful consideration, the panel submits its findings in a report to the DSB. The
DSB will adopt the report unless: 1) a party to the dispute formally appeals the panel
decision; or 2) the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report. See id. art. 16.4. If
there is an appeal, and the Appellate Body upholds the legal findings and conclusions of
the panel, the DSB will adopt the panel's report, (unless the DSB decides by consensus not
to adopt the decision). See id. art. 17.14.
156. See John Warren Kindt, Dispute Settlement in International Environmental Issues:
The Model Provided by the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 22 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 1097, 1112 (1989).
157. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 280.
158. See id. arts. 279-99.
159. See id. arts. 279-85.
160. See id. art. 279; U.N. Charter art. 33.
161. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 282.
162. See generally id. art. 284.
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method covered within section one or on the request of any party to
the dispute, the dispute will be submitted to a court or tribunal deter-
mined under UNCLOS Article 287.163
UNCLOS part VX, section 2, contains eleven articles and proce-
dures 164 which, subject to the slim exceptions in section 3,165 establish
a compulsory dispute settlement system for binding decisions under
virtually all provisions of UNCLOS. It is not, however, a unitary sys-
tem of dispute settlement because it allows the parties to choose be-
tween one of four legal forums: the ICJ, a special International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, an international arbitral tribunal, and
a special technical arbitral tribunal.
166
Section three of UNCLOS part XV exempts a limited number of
disputes from section two. 167 The exceptions vary, but are primarily
aimed at recognizing territorial sovereignty and military activities.
These exceptions can not be interpreted as significantly hampering the
effectiveness of part XV's binding resolution provisions.
C. UNCLOS and the ICJ
As indicated above, the United States has been challenged on nu-
merous occasions under GATT/WTO for taking action to protect the
international environment in violation of GATT. 168 While UNCLOS
mandates the protection of the international environment, the United
States will not be able to avail itself of UNCLOS jurisdiction. The
refusal of the United States to ratify UNCLOS precludes access to
those dispute settlement procedures. Even the fact that the ICJ may
have been elected as a judicial forum under Article 287(1)(b) of
UNCLOS will not give the ICJ jurisdiction over non-parties to UN-
CLOS such as the United States.
169
The time may be ripe for the United States to revisit a prescient
and creative suggestion made by Louis Sohn. This suggestion might
give the United States an opportunity to defend its actions in a neutral
163. See id. art. 286-287.
164. See id. arts. 286-296.
165. See id. arts. 297-299.
166. See id. art. 287.
167. These exempted disputes relate primarily to marine scientific research and fisher-
ies in the EEZ. See id. art. 297, paras. 2 & 3. However, these disputes remain subject to
the conciliation procedures. See id. art. 284. A state may also file an optional declaration
that will exclude binding dispute settlement in maritime boundary disputes and military
activities. See id. art. 298. Disputes related to the deep sea bed are referred to the Seabed
Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea. See id. arts. 186-91,
285.
168. See generally Tuna I, supra note 29; Tuna II, supra note 29; Venezuela Gasoline
Decision, supra note 9.
169. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 4 art. 291.
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forum.17 0 The path suggested by Sohn assumes the United States has
not ratified UNCLOS, and is therefore, denied access to UNCLOS
dispute settlement procedures. 17a He also assumes that the United
States accepts the environmental provisions of UNCLOS as a codifi-
cation or restatement of customary international law.' 72 Arising from
these premises he suggests a course of action that opens the door for
the International Court of Justice to interpret and apply such law.
173
Sohn proposed that the United States, which does not presently ac-
cept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, might sign a supplemen-
tary declaration under Article 36 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, accepting the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to
those rules of customary international law codified in UNCLOS, if
necessary with an exception for deep sea bed mining.
174
Under Article 36(2) the United States may declare that it recog-
nizes as "compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in re-
lation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the
jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning... any ques-
tion of international law"'175 relating to the rules of customary IEL
codified in UNCLOS. Such a declaration would confer jurisdiction on
the ICJ, on law of the sea matters, over those states that similarly have
accepted its jurisdiction. However, the Unites States' acceptance of
Article 36(2) jurisdiction would need to avoid the kind of crippling
reservations made under the "optional clause.'
76
This course of action would confer compulsory jurisdiction on the
ICJ under Article 36, independent of the dispute settlement provi-
sions of UNCLOS. The jurisdiction of the ICJ would arise from the
fact that the states involved have agreed to it under Article 36. This
will enable the ICJ to decide whether, for example, the rules of cus-
tomary international law, as codified in UNCLOS, may or may not
prevail over GATT/WTO.
The course that Sohn advocates is admittedly of limited applica-
tion. It would be confined to those countries that have accepted the
Article 36 jurisdiction of the ICJ and have not effectively negated
their acceptance with crippling reservations of the "self judging"
170. See generally, Louis B. SOHN & KRISTEN GUSTAFSON, THE LAW OF THE SEA IN A
NUTSHELL 238-46 (1984).
171. See id. at 246.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.; see also, id. at 239-40.
175. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, art.
36(2).
176. See id. Article 36 is misleadingly titled the "optional clause." The article is only
optional in that states may choose to confer the compulsory jurisdiction on the Court.
However, once conferred, the Court's jurisdiction is compulsory. See SoHN & GUSTAFSON,
supra note 170, at 239.
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kind. 177 Nonetheless, it appears to be a felicitous way of overcoming
some obstacles, bringing the United States within the customary envi-
ronmental law umbrella of UNCLOS, and possibly persuading the
United States to ratify the treaty. The existence of an impartial tribu-
nal and the possibility that IEL can be reaffirmed in a non-GAT/
WTO judicial context, will restore confidence in international adjudi-
cation and help strike the balance between free trade and environ-
mental protection.
CONCLUSION
Disputes arising from the competing paradigms of international
free trade and environmental protection need to be mediated within a
framework that recognizes the reality of potentially conflicting goals
within the international legal order. Consequently, an ideal interna-
tional judicial forum should possess jurisdiction to take cognizance of
both bodies of law, and hold the balance, while resolving or mediating
conflicts and disputes.
It is unjust to allow a court created by the DSB of GATT/WTO,
which recognizes only trade law, to adjudicate conflicts between the
trade laws that tribunal is established to advance and environmental
laws based on different and contradictory goals. Nonetheless, that is
precisely the coveted position in which GATIT/WTO finds itself.
Charged and empowered to advance and apply trade law alone
GAT/WTO rather than a tribunal with a broader mandate has been
invited to effectively rule upon environmental treaties that fall outside
the pale of its judicial recognition. As we have seen, GATT/WTO's
institutional and constitutional infirmities prevent it from performing
this judicial role. Not surprisingly, the DSBs of GATr/WTO have
been oblivious to the diversity of international law, and have ignored
the fact that environmental norms and goals are an integral and per-
manent part of a pluralistic international community.
The choice of forum is a key strategic element that increases the
chances of prevailing on the merits178 and is an important factor in
successful international litigation.179 Differences in procedural and
substantive rules and the qualifications of judges are of great impor-
tance to the final outcome of a case. So too are the articulated and
unarticulated political, legal, economic, and social premises and biases
177. These are reservations that allow the state, not the court, to declare that a case is
removed from the ICJ's jurisdiction because the case involves domestic jurisdiction or na-
tional security.
178. See Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 783 (1985).
179. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 3 (3d ed. 1996).
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of the judges, not to mention the inconvenience of a forum adminis-
tering an unfamiliar body of law. Hitherto, the proponents of free
trade have achieved judicial hegemony by challenging environmental
rules in their own forum. This hegemony is unfair and ought to be
stopped.
Those pursuing IEL objectives should have the opportunity to
prosecute their cases in a forum which, if not sympathetic to them, will
at least hold the balance between trade and environmental objectives.
This Article has argued that the substantive law of UNCLOS can be
applied within the judicial tribunals of UNCLOS, as well as in the
ICJ. These forums present the world with a fairer, more just prospect
of vindicating environmental claims than that offered by the
GAT-r/WTO.
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25:189
